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A Search for Accountability: Judicial

Discipline Under the Judicial Article of
the 1970 illinois State Constitution
PINKY WASSENBERG*

Three issues have arisen since the adoption of the 1970 Illinois
State Constitution which may be viewed as bases for revision Of the
Judicial Article's section on judicial discipline. 1 All three issues were
brought to the fore in a 1977 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Harrod
v. Illinois Courts Commission.2 The issues raised in this case have
become focal points of attention regarding Illinois' system of judicial
discipline and their resolution will do much to determine the future
character of that system.
Article VI, the Judicial Article of the 1970 Constitution, created
a two-tiered system for the administration of judicial discipline consisting of the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board3 (hereinafter the "Board")
and the Illinois Courts Commission 4 (hereinafter the "Commission").
The Board investigates charges of judicial misconduct, and if a charge
is substantiated by its investigation, acts as prosecutor during the
hearing. That hearing is conducted before the Commission, the adjudicator of all charges of judicial misconduct.
Only six other states have two-tiered systems separating the
investigative and prosecutorial functions (performed by the Illinois
Board) from the decision-making function (performed by the Commission).' This separation of functions is seen as a way of avoiding
conflicts of interest that may occur when one entity investigates,
* Assistant Professor, Political Studies Program/Center for Legal Studies,
Sangamon State University; B.A., University of Nevada-Las Vegas; M.A., Washington State University; J.D. Lewis and Clark School of Law; Ph.D. Washington State
University.
1. ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 15.
2. 69 I11. 2d 445, 372 N.E.2d 53 (1977).
3. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(b)-(d).
4. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15 (e)-(g).
5. Five of the states are Alabama, Ohio, Oklahoma, West Virginia and
Wisconsin. Delaware "also conforms to this pattern, except it is a three-tiered
system...." M.

CoMIsKY

&

P.

SATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE

PATTERSON,

153-54 (1987).
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prosecutes, and rules on charges of judicial misconduct. 6 However,
the other 44 states appear not to have found major conflict of interest
problems with their unitary systems which have one organization
performing all three functions.
Another unusual feature of the Illinois judicial discipline system
is the extent to which the constitution limits state supreme court
participation. Only two other states, Delaware and Oklahoma, do not
provide for state supreme court involvement in their disciplinary
systems. 7 In Illinois, this insulation of the judicial discipline system
from the state's supreme court is explained as necessary to maintain
public confidence in the integrity of the discipline system.' The
underlying assumption is that the public doubts the credibility of a
system to discipline judges which is an administrative entity within
the judicial branch of government. However, forty-seven states give
their supreme courts a role in judicial discipline by having them either
rule directly on a complaint or review the merits of the decision of
the body that made the initial ruling. 9
The three issues raised by Harrod involve questions about the
relationship between these two tiers of the discipline system and the
Illinois Supreme Court under the 1970 Constitution. 10 The first issue
is whether the Illinois Supreme Court has the authority to determine
whether an action by either the Board or the Commission is beyond
their authority under the Judicial Article." The second issue focuses
on identification of the standards to be used by the Board and the
Commission in evaluating judicial conduct. 2 The third issue concerns
what actions the Board and the Commission are permitted to take
when they receive allegations of judicial misconduct based on the
interpretation of a statute not yet clarified by an appellate court. 3
6. See Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-Tier" Judicial Disciplinary System: Five
Years and Counting, 54 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 69 (1977); R. Cohn, Comparing One-

and Two-Tier Systems, 63 JUDICATURE 244 (1979).
7. See CoWSKY, supra note 5.

8. See Greenberg, supra note 6, at 73; Cohn, supra note 6, at 246-47.
9. Id. Some state supreme courts have ruled that they have an inherent power
to discipline judges, short of removal. However, when the states' constitutions have
been amended to include specific provisions for judicial discipline, the supreme courts
have held that the constitutional provisions superseded the inherent powers. Cameron,
J. The Inherent Power of a State's Highest Court to Discipline the Judiciary, 54
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 45 (1977); COMISKY, supra note 5.
10. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 445, 372 N.E.2d
53 (1977).
11. Id. at 457-62, 372 N.E.2d at 58-61.
12. Id. at 468-70, 372 N.E.2d at 63-64.
13. Id. at 471-73, 372 N.E.2d at 65-66.
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The balance of this article will focus on the controversy surrounding the Harrod decision and examine the implications of these issues
on the calling for another state constitutional convention. 14 As a
foundation for that examination, Part I will summarize the evolution
of judicial discipline in Illinois and describe in greater detail the
current two-tiered discipline process. Part II will then consider and
analyze the catalyst of the controversy, the Harrod decision.
I.
A.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

BEFORE 1964

The 1818 Illinois State Constitution provided two methods for
the involuntary removal of a member of the state judiciary."5 A judge
could be removed from office for misdemeanors committed in office
if a majority of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly
voted to pass articles of impeachment, and two-thirds of the Senate
voted to convict after sitting as the trier of fact and law on those
articles of impeachment.16 Alternatively, a judge could be removed
from office for misconduct insufficient to warrant impeachment." 7
This method of removal required a resolution passed by a two-thirds
vote of each house to remove a judge from office. 8 Both the impeachment and legislative removal provisions were continued in the 1848
Constitution. '9
The 1870 Constitution continued the provision for impeachment2o
but modified the legislative removal provision. The modified provision
allowed the General Assembly to remove a judge "for cause", after
a hearing, upon a three-fourths vote of each house. 2'
The constitutional mechanism for impeachment was used only
twice against state judges, once in 1832 and again in 1843. Both cases
14. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § l(b) requires that the voters be given the opportunity
to request a constitutional convention if, at the end of any twenty year period, one
has not been called.
15. For a general discussion of the 1818 Illinois State Constitution and its
successors, see G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED
(1969); J. CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS,
1818-1970 (1972).
16. ILL. CONST. OF 1818, art. II, § 22-23.
17. ILL. CONST. OF 1818, art. IV, § 5.
18. Id.
19. ILL. CONST. OF 1848, art. III, § 27-28 (impeachment power); art. V, § 12
(1848) (reasonable cause insufficient to impeach).
20. ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art. IV, § 24.
21. ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art. VI, § 30.
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
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involved allegations of misconduct by state supreme court justices
22
and both resulted in acquittal.
B.

THE 1964 AMENDMENT

In 1964, the Judicial Article of the 1870 Constitution was revised
extensively through a constitutional amendment approved by the
voters in 1962.23 The new Judicial Article departed from the older
practice of placing the responsibility for judicial discipline in the
legislature. The 1964 Amendment created a new commission, the
Illinois Courts Commission, and gave it primary responsibility for

judicial discipline in Illinois.4 The new Commission included one
member of the supreme court chosen by that court, two members of
the appellate court chosen by the appellate court, and two judges
from the circuit court chosen by the supreme court.25 The Commission
was convened by the supreme court upon its own order or at the
request of the Senate. It operated under procedures set down by the
supreme court. 26 After a hearing, the Commission had the authority
to order a judge retired for disability, suspended without pay, or

27
removed from office for cause.
The 1964 Amendment of the Judicial Article did not refer to the

1870 Constitution's Article II provision authorizing impeachment.
This left open the question of whether or not the new judicial

22. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 70.
In 1832 the Illinois House of Representatives voted articles of impeachment
against Justice Theophilus W. Smith of the Illinois Supreme Court, charging
him with "high misdemeanors." His trial before the Illinois Senate resulted
in acquittal and a subsequent effort to remove him by address failed. In
1843 the Illinois House of Representatives voted articles of impeachment
against Justice Browne of the Illinois Supreme Court and he, too, was
acquitted by the Senate. The proceedings against Justice Browne were
apparently the last attempt to remove an Illinois judge by impeachment.
Id. citing W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 96-97 (1970); G. FIEDLER, THE
ILLINOIS LAW COURTS IN TmE CENTURIES 1673-1973 314 (1973).
23. ILL. CONST. art. VI (1964). Because the amendment was approved by the
voters in 1962 but did not take effect until 1964, it is referred to as either the 1962
Amendment or the 1964 Amendment. For a description of events leading up its
adoption, see BRADEN & COHN, supra note 15; Flamm, Retirement, Suspension and
Removal of Judges Under the Proposed Judicial Article, 46 ILL. B.J. 966 (1958);
FLAMM, Retirement, Suspension and Removal of Judges, 50 ILL. B.J. 695 (1962
Supp.).
24. ILL. CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 18 (1964).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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discipline section worked as an implied repeal of the 1870 impeachment provision with regard to the judiciary. In Cusack v. Howlett,21
the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that an implied repeal had taken
place. 29 They held that the power to remove judges had been taken
from the legislative branch and placed solely within the judicial branch
in 1964 with the creation of the Commission.3 °
C.

THE 1970 PROVISIONS

The 1970 Constitution clarified the relationship between the
judicial discipline structure and the impeachment process, and it also
made large-scale changes in the 1964 discipline system.31 Section 14
of Article IV reasserted the House of Representatives' power to
conduct investigations pursuant to its ability to impeach all important
executive and judicial officers.3 2 The specific inclusion of judicial
officers as subject to impeachment was intended to override the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Cusak v. Howlett.3 Impeachments are
tried before the Senate and conviction requires a two-thirds vote of
34
all Senators.
The judicial discipline process was changed from a one-tier
system, included within the judicial branch, to a two-tier system
independent of the judicial branch. The new two-tier system includes
the Illinois State Judicial Inquiry Board and the Illinois Courts
Commission.3 5
Frank Greenberg, a member of the first Board convened, identified two factors that motivated the 1970 remodeling of the judicial
discipline system.3 6 First, he described the turmoil in 1969 surrounding
28. 44 111.2d 233, 254 N.E.2d 506 (1969).
29. Id. at 243-44, 254 N.E.2d at 511-12. For a discussion of this controversy,
see D. Miller, 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED FOR LEGISLATORS 36-37 (3d
ed. 1987); BRADEN & COHN, supra note 15, at 374-75.
30. Cusack, 44 Ill. 2d at 240-44, 254 N.E.2d at 509-12.
31. For an overview of the events leading up to the creation of the 1970
Constitution and its provisions, see L. PELEKOUDAS, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION:

FINAL

REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS, ASSEMBLY ON THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

(1962); E.

GERTZ & J. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE

SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1980).
32. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14. See also D. Miller, supra note 29, at 36-37.
33. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
34. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14.

35. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15. For an overview of the new discipline system see

D. ROLEWICK, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS
also notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
36. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 71-73.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

30-31 (1976). See
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charges of misconduct brought against the sitting Chief Justice of the
Illinois Supreme Court and an Associate Justice of that court.3 7 These
charges led to the creation of an ad hoc commission to investigate
the complaints, since the regular commission was viewed as too closely
tied to the justices who were the subjects of the complaints.38 According to Greenberg, the need for the special commission highlighted the
problems of a judicial discipline system contained within the judicial
branch and led to a loss of public confidence in the existing system.3 9
The second factor contributing to the momentum toward changing
the 1964 system was what Greenberg described as the state bar's
"pervasive dissatisfaction" with the 1964 system. ° That dissatisfaction
included the feeling that the Commission was ineffective partially1
4
because it was convened only by order of the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Board is the investigatory and prosecutorial arm of the
discipline system created by the 1970 Constitution. 42 It is composed
of two circuit court judges chosen by the supreme court, and four
laypersons and three lawyers appointed by the governor. The nine
members of the Board serve four-year terms, and they are limited to
serving a total of eight years. The Board is permanently convened,
and it has the authority to receive or initiate complaints against judges
and to conduct investigations into those complaints. 43 If five members
decide a complaint has merit, the Board may file a formal complaint
with the Commission.
The Commission has five members including: one Illinois Supreme Court Justice chosen by that court, two appellate court judges
chosen by the appellate court, and two circuit court judges selected
by the Illinois Supreme Court." Like the Board, the Commission is
convened permanently. After notice and a hearing, the Commission
can reprimand, censure, suspend without pay, or remove any judge
found to have engaged in willful misconduct in office, persistently
failed to perform his/her duties, or engaged in conduct "prejudicial
to the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.

41. Id.at 72.

42. The Board's composition and powers are covered in ILL. CONST. art. VI, §
15 (b) and (c).
43. ILL. CONST. art VI, § 15(c).
44. The composition and authority of the Commission is set out in ILL. CONST.
art. VI, § 15(e)-(g) of the 1970 Constitution.
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If the Commission determines that a judge is no
,,45
to perform, it may either suspend
longer physically or mentally able
6
judge.
the
without pay or retire
Three members of the Commission must agree on a particular
explicitly states that decisions of the
decision. 47 The constitution
48
final.
Commission are
Most differences of opinion about the performance of the twotiered system created in 1970 relate to one of the three issues raised
9
in the Harrod case referred to above 4 They include disagreement
over: (1) the authority of the Illinois Supreme Court to consider
allegations that either the Board or the Commission has acted beyond
its authority under the Constitution; (2) the standards to be used in
determining whether there has been actionable judicial misconduct;
and (3) the authority of the Board and Commission when the alleged
misconduct involves the interpretation of an arguably unclear statute.
disrepute.

.

..

II.
A.

Harrod v. Illinois Courts Commission4'

THE HARROD DECISION

On December 3, 1976, the Commission ordered Judge Samuel
Harrod III of the Eleventh Circuit Court suspended from his duties
for one month, without pay.5 The Commission was acting on a
formal complaint filed with it by the Board charging Judge Harrod
with "willful misconduct in office, conduct prejudicial to the administration of5 2justice, and conduct that brought the judicial office into
disrepute." ,
The Board alleged that the judge repeatedly violated Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 61 (c)(18) which requires that, when sentencing,
a judge follow the law and not impose sentences which are not
authorized by law." In a series of cases, Judge Harrod imposed
sentences which included requirements that: (1) 26 male defendants
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
Supreme

§ 15(e)(1).
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e)(2).
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(f).
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(f).
See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
69 Il1. 2d 445, 372 N.E.2d 53 (1977).
Id. at 451, 372 N.E.2d at 55-56.
Id. at 452, 372 N.E.2d at 56.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 61(c)(18). The Illinois Constitution gives the Illinois
Court the authority to adopt rules of conduct for state judges. ILL. CONST.
ILL. CONST. art. VI,

art. VI, § 13(a).
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have their hair cut; (2) 15 probationers leave their drivers' licenses in
the custody of the court clerk in return for cards identifying them as
on probation; and (3) three defendants convicted of illegally transporting alcohol collect cans and bottles along highways.1 4 In addition,
the judge had refused to grant bail to one defendant charged with
driving while intoxicated. Harrod did so on the grounds that, when
arrested, the defendant was out on bail awaiting trial on two other
counts of the same offense.55
In his response to the Board's complaint, Judge Harrod argued
that his creative sentencing was within his judicial discretion under
state statute.5 6 That statute states:
(a) The conditions of probation and of conditional discharge
shall be that the person:
(1) not violate any criminal statute... ; and
(2) make a report to and appear in person before such
person or agency as directed by the court.
(b) The Court may in addition to other conditions require that
the person:
[10 permissible conditions are given]. 57
According to Judge Harrod, the sentences referred to in the
Board's complaint were within his interpretation of the statute's
phrase "in addition to other conditions". Specification of these other
conditions, he argued, was left to the discretion of the sentencing
judge. Furthermore, he pointed out that this particular statute had
yet to be interpreted by an appellate court which was the body with
the authority to review his interpretation."
With regard to the case in which he had denied bail, Harrod
cited supporting precedent.5 9 Based on these two premises, Harrod
argued that his actions were reviewable through the regular appellate
process and were not within the authority of either the Board or the
CommissionO
54. Harrod,69 Ill. 2d at 452-53, 372 N.E.2d at 56.
55. Id. at 453, 372 N.E.2d at 56.
56. Id. at 453-54, 372 N.E.2d at 57.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3 (1973) (emphasis added).
58. Harrod, 69 I11.2d 445, 453-54, 372 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1977). An appeal of
one of Judge Harrod's haircut sentences was pending before the Court of Appeals.
See People v. Dunn, 43 I11.App. 3d 94, 356 N.E.2d 1137 (1976).
59. People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 60 Ill. 2d 74 (1975) cited in Harrod,
69 Ill. 2d at 454, 372 N.E.2d at 57.
60. Harrod, 69 I11.445, 454, 372 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1977).
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The Board responded that Article VI, section 15 of the 1970
Constitution gave both the Board and Commission the authority to
examine any judicial authority to examine any judicial conduct which
might, in their interpretation:
[1] represent "willful misconduct in office,"
or,
[2] be "prejudicial to the administration of justice,"
61
disrepute."
into
office
[31 bring "the judicial
In the Board's view, Harrod's sentencing behavior fit all three
descriptions of misconduct. It offered two possible constructions of
the sentencing statute, both at odds with the one presented by Judge
Harrod. 62 The Board found that the "other conditions" referred to
in the statute were the two conditions listed in the statute's preceding
63
in the statute.
paragraph, not conditions beyond those enumerated
Alternatively, the other conditions could be ones not enumerated but
64
of a type similar to those listed. Under either construction, the Board
65
found Harrod's sentences beyond the authority of the statute. In
addition, the Board argued that the appealability of these sentences
of whether they also constituted
was not relevant to the question
66
grounds for judicial discipline.
After a hearing, the Commission agreed with the Board's conclusions that (1) the fact that the sentence could be appealed was
irrelevant; and (2) they had the authority to act whenever judicial
67
by the Board.
conduct met the three constitutional conditions cited
The Commission, however, dismissed the part of the complaint dealing
with the denial of bail and also disagreed with the Board's interpretation of the statute, offering yet another interpretation. The Commission's interpretation was a modification of the Board's second
alternative. The "other conditions" permitted were those which were:
(1) of a type similar to those enumerated; (2) "directed toward
rehabilitation;" (3) "reasonably related" to the offense for which the
defendant was being sentenced; and (4) "not unduly restrictive of
personal liberties". 68 The Commission offered this interpretation de61. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(c) for the authority of the board; ILL. CONST.
art. VI, § 15(e) for that of the Commission.
62. Harrod,69 I11.2d 445, 455, 372 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1977).
63. Id. at 455, 372 N.E.2d at 57.
64. Yd.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.at 456, 372 N.E.2d at 58. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text
for discussion of the constitutional conditions.
68. Harrod,69 I11. 2d 445, 456, 372 N.E.2d 53, 58 (1977).
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spite the fact that, during the time between the Board's ruling and
the Commission's ruling, an appellate court had ruled only that
the
other conditions had to be related to the defendant's crime.69
Based on its construction of the statute, the Commission dismissed the charges involving those defendants ordered to pick
up
bottles and cans.70 However, it held that the sentences involving
the
haircut orders and confiscation of drivers' licenses were without
legal
authority and, therefore, constituted judicial misconduct meriting
discipline. 71 Judge Harrod was suspended from office, without
pay,
for one month. 72
Ten days after the Commission filed its final order, Judge Harrod
requested a rehearing and a stay pending that rehearing. Both
requests
were denied. Judge Harrod then petitioned the Illinois Supreme
Court
for permission to file for a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to expunge his record. That petition was granted. 73
The first point addressed by the Supreme Court in acting
on
Judge Harrod's petition was its jurisdiction to do so. The Board
and
Commission argued that the Commission's order was not reviewable
because section 15(f) of article VI of the 1970 Constitution
states:
"The decision of the Commission shall be final." ' 74 While the
court
agreed that it lacked the power to review the Commission's
decision
on the evidence in a case, it ruled that it did have the authority
to
question whether the Commission had exceeded its constitutional
authority. 7 The Court found this power in a series of provisions
in
the state constitution which combine to make that court "the
final
arbiter of the Constitution".76
The second point addressed by the court in Harrodinvolved
the
question of which standards are to be used by the Board and
Commission when assessing judicial conduct. The Board's position
was
that it had the authority to examine conduct which may violate
either
the Standards of Judicial Conduct created by the Illinois Supreme
69. People v. Dunn, 43 111. App. 3d 94, 96, 356 N.E.2d 1137,
1138 (1976).
70. 1,arrod, 69 Ill.
2d 445, 456, 372 N.E.2d at 58.
71. Id. at 456-7, 372 N.E.2d at 58.
72. Id. at 456-57, 372 N.E.2d at 58 (1977). One member of
the Commission
dissented on the grounds that they did not have jurisdiction
since the sentences were
within Harrod's judicial discretion. Id. at 457.
73. Id. at 474, 372 N.E.2d at 66.
74. Id. at 457, 372 N.E.2d at 58.
75. Id. at 457-58, 372 N.E.2d at 58-59.
76. Id. Three constitutional provisions were relied on: the separation
of powers
provision, ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1; and the provisions specifying
the court's judicial
authority and jurisdiction, ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1 and 4,
respectively.
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Court or the standards determined by the Board to fall within the
Constitution's reference to willful misconduct, prejudicial or disrep77
utable conduct.
The court rejected the Board's argument. The Judicial Article of
the 1970 CQnstitution gives the supreme court the authority to set
rules of conduct for state judges." According to the court, the framers
of that article intended for those standards to be the exclusive basis
79
for the operation of the disciplinary system created in section 15.
The court said that the language in article VI, section 15 about willful
misconduct and prejudicial or disreputable conduct was not intended
to provide the Board or Commission with the authority to create their
own standards of judicial conduct independent of those established
by the court. 80 Instead, that language was intended to guide the Board
and Commission in deciding whether a judge's violation of one of
the supreme court's rules was more than "a technical violation", and
thus, justification for discipline.8" In addition, the terms used in the
constitutional provisions regarding willful misconduct are so broad
that, as standards for judicial conduct, they would be subject to
attack as overly broad. 2 Therefore, only conduct violative of the
Supreme Court's Standards for Judicial Conduct can provide grounds
for Board or Commission action."
The third point made by the court in the Harrod case dealt with
the question of what the Board and Commission were to do with
allegations of judicial misconduct predicated on an interpretation of
an arguably unclear statute which had yet to be clarified by an
appellate court. 4 The court rejected the contention that because a
judge's action was appealable, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the
judicial discipline system. However, they agreed with Judge Harrod,
"that to maintain an independent judiciary mere errors of law or
simple abuses of judicial discretion should not be the subject of
discipline .. ."5 Nonetheless, the court stated that judicial discretion
has limits. One of these limits is the supreme court rule prohibiting
77. Id. at 463, 372 N.E.2d at 61. The constitutional language referred to by
the Board is found in ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15 (c).
78. ILL. CONST. art VI, § 13(a).
2d 445, 463-70, 372 N.E.2d at 61-64.
79. Harrod, 69 I11.
80. Id. at 468, 372 N.E.2d at 63.
81. Id. at 468, 372 N.E.2d at 63-64.
82. Id. at 469, 372 N.E.2d at 64.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 471-73, 372 N.E.2d at 65-66.
85. Id.at 471, 372 N.E.2d at 65.
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sentences not authorized by law.8 6 Therefore, "where the law is clear
on its face," a judge who repeatedly issues sentences not authorized
by law can be brought before the judicial discipline system.' 7
Since the Board had charged Harrod with a violation of a relevant
supreme court rule, the Board was within its authority. 8 However,
that authority does not extend to the interpretation of "statutory
ambiguities. , 89 Such interpretations are solely within the power of the
judicial branch.9 The court pointed out that, if the Board or Commission could interpret an unclear statute and discipline a judge for
acting contrary to its interpretation, and if an appellate court had
issued a different interpretation of the same statute, then the judge
would be in a no-win situation. Any action taken would subject that
judge to either reversal on appeal or to judicial discipline. 91 In a
concluding paragraph, the court summarized its ruling:
The function of the Commission is one of fact finding. Its
function in this case was to apply the facts to the determined
law, not to determine, construe, or interpret what the law
should be. We find that the Commission exceeded its constitutional authority when, in determining whether [Judge Harrod's] orders were without authority of law, it applied its own
independent interpretation and construction of [the stat92
ute] ....

The Supreme Court granted Judge Harrod's petition for mandamus, declared his suspension void, and ordered the Commission to
expunge it from the records. 93
B.

THE IMPACT OF THE HARROD DECISION

The response to the court's opinion in Harrod was mixed. Fred
Greenberg, then a member of the Board, wrote the major critique of
the opinion and charged that the court had unconstitutionally deprived
the Board and Commission of their independence from the judiciary. 94
Taking a different perspective, Francis Morrissey wrote supporting
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
Harrod, 69 Ill.
2d 445, 472, 372 N.E.2d at 65.
Id. at 470, 372 N.E.2d at 64.
Id. at 473, 372 N.E.2d at 65-66.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 473, 372 N.E.2d at 66.
Id. at 473, 372 N.E.2d at 66 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 474, 372 N.E.2d at 66.
See generally Greenberg, supra note 6.

90. Id. at 473, 372 N.E.2d at 65-66.
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the court's decision. 95 Morrissey had participated in preparing the
amicus brief the Illinois Judges Association filed in the Harrodcase.
The decision was commented on by two Michigan scholars who used
the issues raised in Harrod as the 96basis for theii argument that the
Illinois system is inherently flawed.
Before examining the commentators' contrasting perceptions of
the Harrod decision and the conclusions that can be drawn from
them, it is important to note the difficulty 'ofobjectively assessing the
performance of any system of judicial discipline. The difficulty lies
in the nature of the problem the systems are created to solve. That
problem, judicial misconduct, is similar to other forms of deviant
behavior in its resistance to objective measurement. Before the amount
of judicial misconduct in a system can be measured, judicial misconduct itself must be defined. The Harrod case provides an example of
the difficulty of reaching agreement on such a definition. The Board
saw Judge Harrod's haircut, drivers' license, and bottle-and-can sentences as judicial misconduct. They also saw the denial of bail decision
as misconduct. 97 The Commission saw only the haircut and drivers'
license sentences as misconduct. 98 The Illinois Supreme Court, and
99
presumably Judge Harrod, saw none of the sentences as misconduct.
Even if some consensus on the definition of judicial misconduct
could be reached, measurement difficulties would remain.100 Since
misconduct can be the subject of punishment, or at least social and
professional stigmatization, judges are not likely to openly admit to
it. Perceptions of members of the bar and judiciary regarding the
amount of judicial misconduct tend to be unreliable, because these
perceptions are influenced by personal grudges, partisan and ideological differences, differences of opinion about specific cases, and
unsubstantiated anecdotes. Official records of disciplinary commissions may also be an unreliable measure, reflecting the efficiency of
a commission rather than the extent of the problem.
Given these difficulties in assessing how much judicial misconduct
plagues Illinois, predictions about the impact Harrodwill have on the
95. See Morrissey, The Illinois Courts Commission and JudicialIndependence:
JudicialDisciplinaryProceedings in the Wake of Harrod, 59 Cm. B. REc. 188 (1978).
96. See Gillis & Fieldman, Michigan's Unitary System of JudicialDiscipline:A
Comparison with Illinois' Two-Tier Approach, 54 CnI[-]KENT L. REv. 117 (1977);
cf. R. Cohn, Comparing One- and Two-tier Systems, 63 JUDICATURE 244 (1979).
97. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 57-60 & 84-92 and accompanying text.
100. Schoenbaum, A HistoricalLook at Judicial Discipline, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L.
REv. 1 (1977).
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effectiveness of the Board and Commission must be viewed as speculative. Similarly, one needs to approach with caution the question
of whether the discipline section of the Judicial Article of the 1970
Illinois Constitution should be amended in response to Harrod.
Consideration of this question will be divided into three parts reflecting the three issues raised and decided in Harrod.
1.

The FinalAuthority
In Harrod, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that it had the
constitutional obligation to address the question of whether either the
Commission or the Board had exceeded its authority under the Judicial
Article.' 0 1 Such a power is part of the court's role as the final arbiter
of the state constitution. That role includes the responsibility to
consider whether any organ of state government has acted ultra vires.
Section 15(f) of the judicial discipline section of the constitution
states: "The decision of the Commission shall be final". 0 2 The court
did not view this provision as prohibiting any judicial examination of
Commission action. Rather, that section was viewed as prohibiting
judicial review of the evidence used by the Board and Commission
and the substance of the rulings they made on that evidence.
On the other hand, the Board, the Commission, and Frank
Greenberg argued that section 15(f) clearly prohibits any judicial
examination of the rulings of the Commission. Greenberg criticized
the court's ruling on this point as "judicial review in the guise of
policing constitutional boundaries," and a "means of constitutional
policymaking or 'amending' the constitution."'' 03 He viewed the effect
of this behavior as "the reassertion by the supreme court of judicial
control over the system."' 4 Such control, according to Greenberg,
led to the problems with the one-tier system created by the 1964
amendment which produced wide-spread dissatisfaction among the
bar and a loss of public confidence in that system. 05
In describing the evolution of the current Illinois system, Greenberg observed that partisan involvement in judicial elections made it
especially important that the judicial discipline system be totally
independent of the state judiciary.106 He therefore finds the supreme
court's assertion of the power to review questions regarding the scope
of the Board's and Commission's authority troubling.
101. Harrod,69 Ill. 2d 445, 457-58, 372 N.E.2d 53, 58-59 (1977).
102. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(f).

103. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 106.
104. Id. at 105.
105. Id. at 71.
106. Id. at 76-77.
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The basis Greenberg gave for his concern implies that the method
by which state judges reach office somehow reduces their capacity to
act objectively regarding charges of judicial misconduct. However,
the members of the Commission are all judges themselves. They have
been selected by the same process as have the judges who may come
before them on charges of misconduct and those on the supreme
court. The judges sitting on the Commission are appointed to those
seats by other judges. It is difficult to understand why the supreme
court's exercise of the power to review questions about the scope of
the Commission's authority contaminates the integrity or independence of a system of judicial discipline already comprised of members
of the judicial branch.
If there were a compelling need to keep the judicial discipline
system totally independent of the state judiciary, it would be reasonable to advocate an amendment to the Judicial Article clarifying
section 15(f) and overruling the Harrod decision on this point. Yet,
even if the need for this independence were conceded, such an
amendment might create a different problem. If the supreme court
had no authority to rule on whether the Board or the Commission
exceeded their authority under the constitution, what checks would
there be on the Board's and Commission's behavior? If they became
the sole interpreters of their constitutional mandate, to whom would
they be accountable should they exceed that mandate?
The only apparent checks on their behavior would be the possibility of further constitutional amendment or the opportunity to defeat
judges sitting on the Commission at their next judicial election. 10 7
These are the same checks available now to limit potential supreme
court abuses of authority. Hence, the controversy over the supreme
court's authority to review the scope of the Commission's authority
can be reduced to a question of whom should be left relatively
unaccountable-the Illinois Supreme Court or the Commission.
2.

Standards of Judicial Conduct

In Harrod, the supreme court ruled that Section 13 of the 1970
Judicial Article gave them exclusive authority to adopt rules of
107. Since members of the Commission are selected by their colleagues on their
respective courts, it is possible that they could be removed by those colleagues for
exceeding their authority. However, such a possibility is not mentioned in the Judicial
Article, and therefore probably would require a decision of the supreme court to
ensure its legitimacy. Such a possibility is not much of an alternative to judicial
review as a check on Commission power since its use would lead right back to the
question of the supreme court's authority to interpret § 15.
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conduct governing the judiciary. 0 8 Neither the Board nor the Commission could develop independent standards for use in judicial
misconduct cases.
The opposite position was taken by the Board and Commission
in Harrod.'°9 Greenberg supported the view of the Commission and
the Board, calling the court's decision "unworkable and an invasion
of the independence of the judicial discipline system"." 0 He argued
that the information available on the deliberations of the drafters of
the 1970 Judicial Article showed no evidence that they intended the
rules created by the supreme court under Section 131" to be the only
rules of conduct applicable. According to Greenberg, if that had been
their intent, there would have been no need for the listing of criteria
in section 15. That section lists reasons (i.e., willful misconduct, and
prejudicial or disreputable conduct) the Commission may use to
invoke available sanctions for judicial misconduct. In Harrod, the
Board and Commission used the criteria as bases for their actions.
This second issue seems to be somewhat of a tempest in a teapot.
Perhaps it is an extension of the battle for "territory" that lies at the
heart of the reviewability issue. The scope of the supreme court's
rules under Section 13 is sufficiently broad to include most incidents
of even the more innovative forms of judicial misconduct. The Board
and Commission had no trouble tying Judge Harrod's behavior to a
section of the court rules. Their additional insistence that he violated
the criteria in Section 15 added nothing of substance to their accusations, since the way in which they alleged he-violated the Section 15
requirements was by violating a specific supreme court rule.
Greenberg advocated allowing both the Board and Commission
to develop independent standards for judicial conduct through a caseby-case definition of the content of the criteria in Section 15.1'2 In
Harrod, the court observed that given the general nature of the
Section 15 provisions, such an approach would be vulnerable to attack
for being sufficiently vague as to deprive judges of notice of the
standards to which they are held." ' Additionally, under Greenberg's
approach, the Board and Commission would be granted total immunity from judicial review and free to define the content of the
provisions in Section 15. The Board and Commission would thus
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Harrod,69 Ill. 2d 445, 462-64, 372 N.E.2d 53, 61 (1977).
Id. at 463, 372 N.E.2d at 61.
Greenberg, supra note 6, at 110.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
Greenberg, supra note 6, at 86-88.
Harrod,69 Ill. 2d 445, 468-69, 372 N.E.2d 53, 64 (1977).

1988:7811

WASSENBERG: JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

become the final arbiters of judicial misconduct, free to expand or
reject the supreme court rules which are authorized by the constitution.
3. Judicial Discipline and Statutory Interpretation
The third issue dealt with in the Harroddecision seems the most
vexing and the one most in need of some constitutional modification.
That issue involves the authority of the Board and Commission when
alleged judicial misconduct involves an ambiguous statute not yet
interpreted by an appellate court.
Judge Harrod asserted that the creative sentences he imposed
which led to the Board's complaint were within the discretion granted
him by the state statute. That statute, defining the conditions judges
can impose on probationers, included a variety of specific conditions
and the phrase "in addition to other conditions". 1 4 Judge Harrod
saw the sentences as permissible "other conditions". An appeal,
involving the question of whether the statute authorized these exercises
in judicial ingenuity, was pending before the state court of appeals at
the time of the Board's and Commission's actions.115 Both the Board
and Commission issued their own interpretations of the statute. The
appellate court eventually issued an opinion containing an interpretation of the statute which differed from both the Board and Commission interpretations. The supreme court relied on the appellate
court interpretation.
The supreme court described the untenable situation that could
develop if the Board and Commission were allowed to interpret vague
statutes and use these interpretations as the bases for charges of
judicial misconduct.," 6 Judges could be faced with one interpretation
coming from higher courts in the judiciary and a different interpretation coming from the judicial discipline bodies. A judge would have
the choice of acting in accord with the disciplinary bodies' interpretation and having his/her decision over-turned on appeal, or acting
in accord with the appellate court interpretation and being open to
charges of judicial misconduct. The Harrod decision prevents that
dilemma from developing by prohibiting the commission from applying its own interpretation. '
Francis Morrissey noted that after the Board filed its complaint
against Judge Harrod, a number of state trial judges, who had been
114. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3(b) (1973).

115. People v. Dunn, 43 Il. App. 3d 94, 356 N.E.2d 1137 (1876).
116. Harrod,69 Il. 2d 445, 473, 372 N.E.2d 53, 66 (1977).
117. Id. at 472, 372 N.E.2d 65.
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interpreting the statute as Judge Harrod had, changed their sentencing
behavior and limited themselves to the conditions enumerated in the
statute."' He argued that this chilling of judicial discretion ran counter
to the intent of the legislature in drafting the statute.
The problem raised by this third issue is not so much with what
the court decided, but rather more with finding out precisely when
this part of the Harroddecision applies in future cases.
It is settled by Harrod that the Board and Commission cannot
interpret vague statutes and use their interpretations as bases for
charges. That seems to imply that if a complaint about judicial
conduct is received and it involves such a statute, both the Board and
the Commission must wait for appellate interpretation before proceeding with the complaint. Given the case loads of higher courts in
Illinois, the wait could be considerable. Meanwhile, the Commission
would be unable to protect the public from a judge engaging in such
conduct. Further, some question exists about when it is safe to assume
that the appellate process has run its course. For example, Harrod
involved a statute interpreted by the court of appeals. In a future
case, perhaps with a closely divided appellate court, would the Board
and Commission be able to act when the court of appeals issued its
interpretation, or would they have to wait to see if the supreme court
chose to consider the matter? If the case raised federal questions,
would the Board and Commission need to wait for possible United
States Supreme Court action?
Perhaps a thornier aspect of this problem is the determination of
when a statute is sufficiently vague to bring the Harrod rule into
effect. John Gillis and Elaine Fieldman argue that the difficulty of
separating issues of legal interpretation from issues of judicial discipline is a primary weakness of the Illinois system." 9 They argue that
this overlap will occur with sufficient frequency so that conflict is
inevitable in a judicial discipline system like Illinois' which prohibits
the supreme court from making determinations on the merits of
complaints.
Statutes are not the only potential source of this sort of conflict.
Constitutions also require interpretation. Following Harrod,questions
arose about the extent to which judges charged with judicial misconduct are protected by procedural and substantive guarantees in the
constitution. For example, the case of Judge Elward 20 involved the

118. Morrissey, supra note 95, at 197.
119. Gillis & Fieldman, supra note 96, at 130.
120. In re Elward, 1 I11. Cts. Corn. 114 (No. 77-CC-1 1977).
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question of whether his right of free speech prohibited charging him
with judicial misconduct based on allegedly misleading campaign
advertisements. IE' The Board found no constitutional bar and filed a
formal complaint with the Commission. The Commission held that
22
Judge Elward's advertisement was protected speech.
III.

CONCLUSION

Given the segregation of Illinois' Supreme Court from the judicial
discipline system, such questions of interpretation are likely to provoke
future controversy even if the Board, the Commission, and the Illinois
Supreme Court put a great deal of effort into avoiding unnecessary
conflict. Their history of interaction leaves little room for optimism
on that score. One means of avoiding a future filled with ongoing
battles would be a constitutional amendment creating and legitimizing
a process by which the Board and/or Commission could request the
equivalent of a supreme court advisory opinion when a complaint of
judicial misconduct rests on the interpretation of an unclear statute
or a constitutional question. It may be best to include a provision to
settle this controversy in any amendment which may be proposed on
the topic of judicial selection, since many of the sources of concern
related to concerns raised by the current selection and retention articles
of the 1970 Constitution. For example, much of the concern expressed
by Greenberg centers on the impact election-related partisanship may
have on the integrity of the judicial discipline system.' 23 The issue in
Elward concerned judicial ethics in campaigns and is an area where
the Illinois Supreme Court and the Board and Commission are likely
to clash in the future. All three issues raised by Harrod are tied
closely to concerns about selection and retention. In fact, the three
issues may be surrogates for concerns about the ethical complications
created by the partisan election of state judges. Therefore, focusing
reformist attention on modification of the selection and retention
provisions of the 1970 Constitution may be more productive in the
121. Judge Elward's lawyers in his judicial discipline case have written an article
supportive of the contention that the constitutional right of freedom of speech gives
judicial candidates a great deal of discretion in choosing the content of their campaign

advertisements: D. Reuben and L. Ring, Judges Have Rights, Too, 59 CHI. B. REC.
220 (1978). Rubin Cohn, a member of the Judicial Inquiry Board filing the complaint
against Judge Elward delivered an intense critique of the Commission's decision in
Judicial Discipline in Illinois - A Commentary on the Judge Elward Decision, 59
CHI. B. REC. 200 (1978).
122. Judges Have Rights, Too, 59 CHI. B. REC. 220, 222 (1978).
123. Greenberg, supra note 6.
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long term than merely modifying the judicial discipline article in
response to the issues raised in Harrod. If the concerns raised by
judicial partisanship were removed, the Illinois Supreme Court and
the disciplinary Board and Commission may be able to evolve a
mutually acceptable interpretation of those sections of the judicial
discipline article which are now the source of controversy.

